When a natural disaster strikes before an election, it can alter political preferences in profound and often unexpected ways. A new IZA discussion paper by Giovanni Gualtieri, Marcella Nicolini, Fabio Sabatini, and Marco Ventura examines the electoral consequences of the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, which devastated central Italy just two months before the European Parliament elections. While previous research has shown that incumbent governments often benefit electorally from disaster response, this study highlights a crucial yet overlooked factor: the role of social capital in shaping voter behavior.
Using a unique dataset that combines high-resolution seismic intensity data, electoral results, and indicators of local civic engagement, the authors find that the earthquake significantly influenced voting patterns—but in a highly heterogeneous way. The national government, led by the center-right coalition of Silvio Berlusconi, gained electoral support in the most affected areas, while local administrators saw no such benefit. However, the extent of this electoral boost depended heavily on pre-existing levels of social capital within communities.
How social capital shields communities from political manipulation
The study reveals that where social capital was low—meaning fewer civic associations—and citizens relied entirely on government institutions for aid, the Berlusconi government successfully capitalized on the disaster response, securing a clear electoral advantage.
Conversely, in municipalities with stronger social capital, where local organizations were active in coordinating relief efforts, the electoral effect of the earthquake was negligible. This suggests that when citizens can rely on their own communities for support, they are less likely to reward the government for disaster relief efforts, as they do not perceive state assistance as their only safety net.
This is a crucial insight, as it challenges the common assumption that voters react uniformly to post-disaster aid. Instead, the effect of government response is mediated by social structures: in fragmented communities, political leaders can leverage crises to consolidate electoral support, while in well-connected societies, this mechanism fails to operate in the same way.
A temporary boost, followed by disillusionment
Interestingly, this effect was short-lived. In subsequent elections, support for Berlusconi’s coalition dropped sharply in the very municipalities where it had initially surged—particularly those with low levels of social capital. This suggests a “post-disaster disillusionment effect”: in the short term, voters may be swayed by high-visibility government interventions, but if the long-term recovery process fails to meet expectations, electoral gains can quickly turn into losses. In essence, promises of swift reconstruction
may generate immediate political rewards, but failing to deliver on those promises erodes trust in the long run.
Policy implications: Rethinking disaster response and governance
These findings have important policy implications for governments and international institutions dealing with disaster response and recovery. First, they highlight the importance of investing in social capital before disasters strike. Stronger community networks reduce dependence on government aid, making disaster response more resilient and less prone to political opportunism.
Second, policymakers should recognize that while high-profile emergency interventions may yield short-term political gains, long-term recovery efforts are crucial in maintaining public trust. Governments that fail to sustain reconstruction efforts risk facing a severe electoral backlash once the initial wave of support fades.
Finally, the study’s results suggest that political leaders may have incentives to focus on immediate relief efforts at the expense of long-term resilience strategies. Understanding how voters respond to disasters can help design policies that prioritize sustainable recovery over short-term political gains, ensuring that crisis management serves public welfare rather than electoral interests.